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Option Investor Rationality Revisited:  
The Role of Exercise Boundary Violations  
 
Abstract 
Do option investors rationally exercise their options?  Numerous studies report evidence of 
irrational behavior.  In this paper, we pay careful attention to intraday option quotes and reach 
the opposite conclusion.  An exercise boundary violation (EBV) occurs when the best bid price 
for an American option is below the option’s intrinsic value. Far from being unusual, we show 
that EBVs occur very frequently.  Under these conditions, the rational response of an investor 
liquidating an option is to exercise the option rather than sell it.  Empirically, we find that the 
likelihood of early exercise is strongly influenced by the existence and duration of EBVs. Not 
only do these results reverse standard theory on American option valuation and optimal exercise 
strategy, but they also suggest that the ability to avoid selling at an EBV price creates an 
additional source of value for American options that is unrelated, and in addition to, dividend 
payments. This additional value may help explain why American options appear overpriced 
relative to European options.   
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NOTE:  An earlier version of this paper was titled:  "Exercise Boundary Violations in American-
Style Options: The Rule, not the Exception." 
  
1 
 
The rationality of option investors has been the subject of considerable research, and the general 
consensus is that their behavior departs significantly from rationality.  For example, Diz and 
Finucane (1993), Poteshman and Serbin (2003), Pool, Stoll, and Whaley (2008), Hao, Kalay, 
Mayhew (2010), and Barraclough and Whaley (2012) all conclude that a significant fraction of 
options investors use irrational exercise strategies for American options.  In this paper, we revisit 
the question of option investor rationality and find that when market frictions are properly 
considered, the behavior of option investors is both consistent with rationality and inconsistent 
with traditional options theory.     
Following Merton (1973), the conventional wisdom is that early exercise of a call on a non-
dividend paying stock is irrational because it yields only the call’s intrinsic value (S – K) and 
thus forfeits its time value.  This perspective, however, does not consider trading frictions.  We 
document that among options that are in-the-money and might be exercised, the option’s bid 
price is frequently lower than the option's intrinsic value.  We call this counter-intuitive situation 
an Exercise Boundary Violation (EBV).   
EBVs play a critical role in assessing investor rationality.  The simple choice for an investor 
seeking to liquidate an option holding is either to sell or exercise their position.  While theory 
holds that early exercise is irrational, under EBV conditions early exercise is the rational choice 
since the option holder receives a greater payout than from selling the option.  Selling under 
EBV conditions gives the counterparty an arbitrage profit from immediate exercise. 
Here is a typical EBV.   At 1:57 P.M. on April 24, 2017, Exxon-Mobil stock was quoted at 
$81.16 bid and $81.17 ask.  The May and June 75 strike calls would expire in 25 and 53 days, 
respectively.  Both options were in the money by $6.16, but the highest bids across all the option 
trading venues were only 5.85 and 5.90, respectively.  The "irrational" decision to liquidate a 
2 
 
long position in either call by exercise would have yielded about 5% more than selling it in the 
market.  This example is not an unusual case.  April 24, 2017 was a typical day and XOM 
options are among the 1% most actively traded single stock options.   
In this paper, we examine a large cross-section of U.S. equity options using price and quote data 
observed at one-minute intervals.  We find that EBVs are frequent, economically large, and very 
hard to avoid.  Overall, 48.6% of all in-the-money call option bid quotes were below intrinsic 
value.  These EBVs are highly persistent and averaged $0.31, large enough that even retail 
investors could save a significant amount by exercising their options instead of selling them.  A 
similar pattern appears in put options where the EBVs remain frequent, persistent, and 
economically large.     
Evidence of boundary violations has been noted in option market studies dating back at least to 
Klemkosky and Resnick (1979) and further developed by Diz and Finucane (1993), Finucane 
(1997), and Engstrom (2002).  Despite this history, our understanding of EBVs is very limited.  
It is well known that option trading costs are large, but many of our colleagues are surprised by 
the frequency and magnitude of EBVs.  In addition, this literature is limited by its reliance on 
closing prices.  For example, a wider bid-ask spread at the close of trading could generate an 
EBV even if there were many minutes without EBVs during the regular trading day.  
This paper provides the first systematic examination of exercise boundary violations and their 
link with investor behavior.  Our results provide clear support for the rationality of option 
exercise.  We find that the existence and duration of boundary violations have strong predictive 
power for the cross-section of individual option exercises.  In addition, remarkably few option 
trades occur at sub-optimal prices.  Across all in-the-money option trades in our sample, only 
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about 2% of them occur at prices that are below the exercise boundary value.  Both findings 
suggest that option investors rationally incorporate EBVs into their trading and exercise 
decisions—even though their actions are inconsistent with option pricing theory.  Even so, the 
dollar loss from the sub-optimal trades appears substantial.  An upper bound estimate is $39 
million for the month of March 2010.  By comparison, this is about three times the average 
monthly loss reported by Barraclough and Whaley (2012) from failure to exercise put options 
optimally.   
An important implication of our findings is in the area of option pricing.  In theory, the only 
value from early call exercise comes from the ability to exercise just before a stock goes ex-
dividend.  If an investor must exit an option position before maturity when EBVs are pervasive, 
the holder of an in-the-money European option expects to lose both the remaining time value and 
the EBV, while a rational American option holder could exercise, giving up the time value but 
avoiding the EBV.  Thus, an American option is worth more than a European call with the same 
terms, independent of dividend payout.  A related paper (Figlewski 2017) shows that the 
difference can easily be more than the value of rational American exercise of a deep in the 
money put, or of a call on a stock about to go ex-dividend.  Empirical studies by Valkanov, 
Yadav, and Zhang (2011) and others find that the observed difference between American and 
European option prices is larger than can be explained by early exercise models. Our findings 
offer a potential resolution to this anomaly.       
This paper is most closely related to Jensen and Pedersen (2016) who also find evidence of 
rational early exercise.  The papers differ in three areas.  First, our approach is extremely simple 
and relies only on the relation between the strike price and the option bid price.  In contrast, 
Jensen and Pedersen develop a model that predicts when early exercise is optimal and then solve 
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their model using numerical methods.  All tests of rationality involve a joint test of investor 
behavior and the underlying pricing model.  While their approach is very interesting, the 
accuracy of their pricing model is uncertain.  For example, EBVs are common in regions of their 
parameter space where their model predicts no early exercise and, in their early exercise 
regressions, EBVs remain the most statistically important factor even after controlling for the 
parameters of their pricing model.   
Second, the model in Jensen and Pedersen (2016) is limited to call options and does not apply to 
put options.  In contrast, our approach extends easily to put options.  In our analysis, we control 
for the potential early exercise of American puts but nevertheless find the same results as with 
call options.  The existence and duration of EBVs remain strong predictors of put option early 
exercise.     
Finally, our intraday data is better suited for testing hypotheses about investor rationality. Like 
most other studies, Jensen and Pedersen (2016) use closing prices and quotes.  Battalio and 
Schultz (2006), however, show that reported closing option prices are often anomalous and may 
even show arbitrage violations due to non-synchronous reporting of stock and option quotes.  
With synchronous intraday data we are able to measure boundary violations much more 
precisely and quantify how they behave during the trading day.  This distinction is important 
because we find the frequency of EBVs within the trading day is a strong predictor of early 
exercise.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of the literature.  Our 
data is described in Section 3.  Section 4 presents the data on exercise boundary violations for 
calls and puts. Since EVBs are critical to our argument supporting investor rationality, we go 
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into considerable detail showing that EBVs are pervasive, economically large and highly 
persistent throughout the trading day.   
Section 5 looks at option trades.  We find that relatively few trades occur at EBV prices and that 
the average EBV associated with these trades is comparatively small.  Section 6 looks at the 
option holder's alternative liquidation strategy, exercise.  We find that non-dividend related early 
exercise is relatively common among both customers and market makers, although the frequency 
of early exercise is greater for the market makers.  We then estimate logit models to examine 
factors that determine the likelihood of early exercise.  Exercise by both customers and market 
makers is highly dependent on the size and duration of EBVs, along with option moneyness.  
Exercise of puts is also strongly influenced by whether the stock price is above or below the put 
option theoretical early exercise boundary. 
In Section 7 we discuss several ways in which EBVs may affect options theory and practice, 
including how American options should be priced in theory and how option positions should be 
marked-to-market in practice, as well as correct calculation of implied volatilities and use of the 
bid-ask spread as a measure of market liquidity.  Section 8 concludes. 
An important issue that we do not attempt to address in the current paper is why the best bid 
prices in the market are so frequently below fair value, to the point that they entail an arbitrage 
profit for the buyer.  Competition among dealers and other liquidity providers ought to force the 
bids up, but it does not.  Yet, discussions with options market makers did not uncover any hidden 
transactions costs or major impediments to option exercise.  We also do not derive an alternative 
American option pricing model to take proper account of the liquidity value of being able to exit 
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an option position early without giving up an EBV.  Such a model is developed in Figlewski 
(2017). 
 
2. Boundary Violations and Option Exercise in the Literature 
Tests of investor rationality are typically joint tests of both rationality and an underlying asset 
pricing model.  As noted in Diz and Finucane (1993), option exercise decisions provide an 
attractive area to test rationality because investor choice is reduced to selecting the best 
alternative between exercising and selling the option.  Most studies of exercise rationality 
conclude that investors frequently make irrational decisions.  For example, Pool, Stoll, and 
Whaley (2008) and Hao, Kalay, and Mayhew (2010) examine the relation between dividends and 
exercise behavior.  In theory, an in-the-money American call should be exercised just before the 
ex-dividend date if the dividend payment is sufficiently large, but these studies find that about 
50% of the calls for which this would be optimal are not exercised.  Barraclough and Whaley 
(2012) provide a comprehensive analysis of option exercise.  They find, as we do, that call 
options are frequently exercised early for reasons unrelated to dividends, yet some deep in-the-
money put options fail to be exercised early.  Diz and Finucane (1993) and Poteshman and 
Serbin (2003) document a tendency for option investors to exercise call options when they would 
have received more by selling the call.   
Despite this research, very little is known about EBVs and their link to early exercise decisions.  
Early option market studies such as Bhattacharya (1983) noted the occurrence of exercise 
boundary violations and Bates (1995) summarizes this literature.  None of these studies 
systematically examine EBVs.  Subsequent work by Diz and Finucane (1993), Finucane (1997) 
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and Engstrom (2002) note a link between EBVs and exercises, but do not analyze the 
relationship in a structured manner.   
An important limitation of these studies is that their data is from the 1980s or earlier.  This 
predates significant structural changes in the options and equity markets and it is not obvious 
their EBV findings apply to today’s markets.  For example, Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011) 
document that equity commissions and bid-ask spreads costs have fallen dramatically while 
trading volume and market depth have strongly improved.  Similarly, studies by Mayhew (2002), 
de Fontnouvelle, Fishe and Harris (2003), and by Saraoglu, Louton, and Holowczak (2014) 
document a decline in option bid-ask spreads from changes in listing eligibility and reductions in 
the minimum required tick size.  Even when restricted to closing prices, Christoffersen, 
Goyenko, Jacobs, and Karoui (2015) report large improvements in option liquidity over the 
1996-2007 period. 
The impact of these changes can be illustrated by contrasting our sample with Finucane (1997).  
His sample spans the calendar years 1988 and 1989 and contains 9.1m call option contracts 
exercised.  In contrast, we observe 13.7m call option exercises (including dividend-related 
exercises) in just the first 20 calendar days of March 2010.  From the late 1980s to 2010, the 
monthly number of contracts exercised has risen more than 100-fold.  Similarly, after excluding 
early exercises associated with dividends, Finucane reports that 38.4% of contracts were 
exercised when the bid price exceeded the strike price.  The comparable frequency for these 
apparently irrational exercises falls to 1.8% in our sample.       
Recent research is more supportive of the idea that market frictions can make it rational to 
deviate from conventional early exercise rules.  In a theoretical model, Duffie, Liu, and 
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Poteshman (2005) formalize the intuition that an American option should be exercised if the 
price falls below intrinsic value.  But they note that an investor’s welfare may be higher by 
retaining the option if markets are incomplete and trading costs are sufficiently large.  While a 
large EBV is not a sufficient reason to exit an option position, it is a sufficient reason to favor 
exercise over selling the option.   
Costly hedging plays a key role in the models of Figlewski (1989) and especially Jensen and 
Pedersen (2016).   Figlewski simulates an options market with rebalancing costs and shows that a 
bid-ask spread sufficient to compensate the market maker for the risk in hedging his position can 
lead to bid prices below intrinsic value.  Jensen and Pedersen consider alternative strategies for 
liquidating an American option position, either by exercise or by synthetically eliminating its risk 
exposure by delta hedging through expiration.  This is the theoretically correct way to avoid the 
problem of an illiquid or nonexistent options market.  They develop and test an elegant 
continuous-time model in which the costs associated with short sales and funding long positions 
can drive prices below intrinsic value.  Their empirical results indicate that these costs are large 
enough in practice to make early exercise often the optimal liquidation strategy, and that their 
model can explain some of the observed "non-rational" early exercise.   
But Jensen and Pedersen (2016), Finucane (1997), and most other researchers analyze only 
closing prices and quotes.  The results are informative, of course, but as Dennis and Mayhew 
(2009) found, tests of option pricing models are sensitive to microstructure issues, and Battalio 
and Schultz (2006) and others have shown that wider spreads and anomalous quotes are 
relatively common in end-of-day prices.  Moreover, closing prices do not reveal what trading 
possibilities may have been available earlier in the day.  Use of intraday data allows us to show 
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that holders of both calls and puts face large and persistent exercise boundary violations 
throughout the trading day.   
The underlying theme in this line of research is that traders often behave irrationally with respect 
to their exercise decisions.  Our position is the opposite: we argue that once EBVs and other 
market frictions are taken into account, much of the behavior that appears irrational in theory can 
be seen to be rational in practice.  Jensen and Pedersen (2016) report findings consistent with our 
interpretation, but for a different reason.  In their model, early exercise becomes optimal if 
market frictions are sufficiently large.  In our approach, early exercise is rational if the bid price 
is below the intrinsic value.  A task for future work is to examine whether their model could 
explain the EBV patterns we observe in the data.  This may be challenging because near term, at-
the-money (but still in-the-money) call options appear to be below the price/strike price barrier 
that would trigger early exercise, yet over one-third of these option quotes have EBVs.    
If an option holder can always realize its theoretical value by selling (or delta hedging) in the 
market, an American call is only better than a European call because it allows exercise just 
before a stock goes ex-dividend.  But when Valkanov, Yadav, and Zhang (2011) and Dueker and 
Miller (2003) tested this theoretical principle in option market prices, they found early exercise 
premiums of 3-6% for call options and 4-10% for put options, much too large to be explained by 
dividend-related early exercise alone.1  Option traders apparently believe that American exercise 
has some additional value unrelated to dividends. 
 
 
1 See also Jorion and Stoughton (1989), McMurray and Yadav (2000), Sung, (1995), Unni and Yadav (1998), and 
Zivney (1991).  
10 
 
3. Data  
Our sample covers options on 2945 stocks across all expiration months for 21 trading days 
during March 2010.  Data from March 22 are corrupt and excluded from the analysis.  We limit 
the sample to options that are in-the-money at the start of the trading day and all ETFs are 
excluded.  In order to focus exclusively on "irrational" exercise, we eliminate all observations for 
dividend paying stocks on the day preceding the ex-dividend day. We also exclude all 
observations on the day of expiration.  Each stock will typically have both call and put options 
with multiple exercise prices, which yields an average of 124,652 individual options for each 
trading day.   
The data come from four sources.  Option trades and quotes are from Livevol.  Trade data 
include the date, time, and size of each transaction.  For option quotes, Livevol provides the 
national best bid and offer prices across the eight option exchanges, reported at one-minute 
intervals.  There are 390 trading minutes per day for each option, which yields a data matrix of 
roughly 1.02 billion elements: 124,652 (options) x 21 (days) x 390 (minutes).  The specific 
contracts in the sample change over time as option moneyness varies with stock price changes, 
and expiration dates pass, and not every option series is quoted every day.  In addition, we 
eliminate very low liquidity contracts with fewer than 180 daily quotes and all observations with 
a bid price of zero.  This reduces our data matrix to approximately 671 million elements.  
Intraday tick data for equity trades and quotes to match the options sample come from the NYSE 
TAQ database.  We use CRSP to identify and exclude ex-dividend days.  Finally, data on daily 
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open interest and exercises from both customer and market maker accounts come from the 
Option Clearing Corporation.2     
 To reduce the dimensionality of the option quotes, we classify the strike price / stock price ratio 
into three moneyness categories:  
"Deep ITM" (X/S < 0.7 for calls and 1.3 < X/S for puts);  
"Mid ITM" (0.7 < X/S < 0.9 for calls and 1.1 < X/S < 1.3 for puts); and 
"Near ITM" (0.9 < X/S < 1.0 for calls and 1.0 < X/S < 1.1 for puts). 
Similarly, we set up three maturity categories: "near term" (1 month or less); "medium term" (2-
4 months); and "long term" (over 4 months).  Within this 3 x 3 x 2 partition, the number of 
observations per cell ranges from 12.1 million to 69.9 million. 
Note that for an option falling into one of these categories, the likelihood that the option will 
remain in-the-money at expiration depends on option maturity and the volatility of the 
underlying stock.  For example, a one-month call on a stock with X / S = 0.9 and annual 
volatility of 40% is in-the-money by less than one standard deviation.  If X / S = 0.8, the 
midpoint of the Mid ITM bracket, a three-month call on that stock is still only 1.1 standard 
deviations in-the-money.  Prices for these options should embed substantial optionality, but as 
we show below, they still have a strong chance of being subject to EBVs. 
Historically, options priced below $3.00 traded on tick size of $0.05 and options priced above 
$3.00 had a tick size of $0.10. In 2007, option exchanges initiated the penny pilot program in 
 
2  The OCC data were generously provided to us by Robert Whaley of Vanderbilt University. 
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which they reduced the tick size for more liquid options.3  In our sample, 178 option classes 
were included in the penny pilot program.  For these options the tick size was reduced to $0.01 
for prices below $3.00, and $0.05 for options above $3.00. 
4. Frequency, magnitude and persistence of boundary violations  
In this section we explore how common EBVs are as a function of moneyness and maturity, how 
large they are economically, and how persistent they are in terms of how long an option holder 
facing an EBV bid at the beginning of the day would have to wait to see a bid at or above 
intrinsic value. 
4.1 Frequency and Size of Boundary Violations  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for exercise boundary violations in our sample.  Panel (a) 
shows results for call options and Panel (b) presents puts.  The largest numbers of quotes are for 
the mid moneyness and long term maturity bins, largely due to the width of the categories, but 
both panels in Table 1 show high quote frequency for all categories, with the smallest cell 
containing more than 20 million observations for calls and 12 million for puts. 
For near term Deep ITM calls, 98.73% of all bids were below intrinsic value and 99% of all 
options in this category had EBV bids at least some of the time.  For near term Mid ITM 
contracts, still 92.77% of all bid quotes were EBVs and more than 98% of all contracts had them.  
Even for near maturity calls that were only a little in-the-money, the best bid in the market was 
below intrinsic value more than a third of the time.  Note that the call in the XOM option 
 
3 Saraoglu, Louton, and Holowczak (2014) examine the impact of the penny pilot program on options trading costs. 
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example above was in the Near ITM moneyness bucket, less than 8% in the money, with X/S = 
0.92.  The XOM June75 contract was also in the middle maturity bucket. 
The frequency of boundary violations falls with longer maturity and lower moneyness as one 
would expect.  Both factors increase an in the money American option's time value, so even if a 
bid is well below a long-dated option's theoretical fair value it is less likely to be below intrinsic 
value and cause an EBV.  Even so, for Deep ITM long maturity calls, about 60% of market bid 
quotes are EBVs.  Interestingly, EBVs are somewhat less common for puts, particularly as 
maturities lengthen, even though in theory puts may be rationally exercised early because their 
theoretical time value can fall to zero.   
Table 1 also provides the mean boundary violation in each maturity and moneyness bucket.  We 
report the unconditional EBV, which is the average of EBVs across all observations, including a 
value of zero for all non-EBV observations.  We also report the conditional EBV, which is the 
average EBV across all quotes that are EBVs.  For comparison, Table 1 also contains the average 
option bid-ask spread.   
A useful comparison is to contrast the EBVs with the quoted bid-ask spread.  While there is 
variation across the buckets, the EBVs are a material fraction of the spread.    For example, 
among the near-term deep in-the-money calls, the average bid-ask spread is $0.72 and the 
average conditional EBV is $0.35, so the boundary violation represents nearly half of the spread.  
A similar pattern occurs in the near-the-money options where the average spread is $0.33 and the 
conditional EBV is $0.14. 
A separate analysis of options that are partitioned into those with prices above $3.00 and below 
$3.00, and into pilot study options and non-pilot study options is presented in a supplementary 
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Appendix that is available from the authors.  It reveals significant differences in liquidity across 
the subgroups, but they generally show the same pattern of EBVs as in Table 1.    
Two other considerations about Table 1 should be noted.  First, our results are not specific to this 
time period.  In untabulated analyses, we find very similar results in August 2008.  Second, the 
EBVs cannot be easily explained by short sale costs.    Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, (2005), and 
Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013) argue that short sale costs are not material for the vast 
majority of stocks.  However, if only a small fraction of stocks have material short sale costs, 
they cannot explain why almost all near-term, Deep ITM options exhibit EBVs.  
The distribution of EBVs for different moneyness and maturity buckets is of considerable 
interest.  Figure 1 plots the percentage of quote minutes that exhibit a boundary violation of a 
given dollar amount for the near term options.  Figure 2 plots the same information for the 
medium maturity contracts.  Note that the horizontal axis starts with an EBV of $0.05.  For 
example, for near term calls in the middle moneyness bucket, Figure 1 shows EBV was at least 
$0.05 about 85% of the time, and over $0.25 about 30% of the time.  EBVs for the comparable 
puts were similar but a little lower.  In Figure 2, the middle moneyness calls with 2 to 4 months 
to maturity showed EBVs of at least $0.05 a little less than half the time, and more than $0.25 
about 20% of the time.  Large EBVs for longer term puts were less common than for calls. 
4.2 Persistence in Exercise Boundary Violations 
Boundary violations need not prevent an option holder from selling at a price above intrinsic 
value as long as there are periods during the day without an EBV.  This cannot be established by 
looking only at closing prices.  To assess EBV persistence, we select 10:00 a.m. as the initial 
observation time, because we can be confident that the options market is fully open by that time 
15 
 
and all strikes and maturities can be traded freely.4  If the 10:00 a.m. quote is a boundary 
violation, we go forward in time and search for the first occurrence of a non-EBV bid, stopping 
the search process at 4:00 p.m.  With this starting time, the maximum duration of a boundary 
violation is 360 minutes. 
Table 2 uses the same partitions for option maturities and moneyness as Table 1.  The results 
show a strong persistence in boundary violations.  For near term Deep and Mid ITM calls and 
puts, more than 90% had EBV bids at 10:00 a.m., and these persisted for many hours on average.  
For example, the average EBV persistence for the near-term Mid ITM contracts is 297 minutes 
for calls and 296 minutes for puts.  A trader who observes an EBV at 10:00 would have to wait, 
on average, until almost 3:00 PM for the EBV to disappear.  A similar pattern is even evident for 
the long-term options.  EBVs are less common in options with more than 4 months to maturity, 
but when they occur, their magnitude and duration are similar.  For example, the violation rate is 
59.51% for the Deep ITM calls, but under 1% for the Near ITM contracts.  Nevertheless, the 
persistence of the violations remains high, 266 and 178 minutes, respectively.   
We will discuss transactions costs and other impediments that affect option trading in the next 
section.   
5.  Boundary Violations and Option Trades 
5.1  Commissions, margins and settlement issues 
The optimal exercise strategy for an investor to liquidate an American option position before 
expiration depends on the actual transactions costs and the other impediments to trading that he 
 
4 Similar results were found when the observations were sampled at 11:00, 12:00, and 2:00. 
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faces.  Securities firms catering to retail traders charge a wide range of commissions and fees.  
We discuss how two of the largest handle early exercises. 
Interactive Brokers (IB), one of the lowest cost firms, provides full electronic information and 
execution facilities online. There is no charge for exercising an option, which can be done at any 
time simply by clicking on a computer screen.  When the "exercise" button is clicked, IB 
immediately places the stock in the investor's account and it can be sold in the market.  Within a 
few seconds the option holder is able to see the market stock price, exercise his call options, and 
sell the stock to lock in the current intrinsic value.  IB's commission for a stock trade is $0.005 
per share ($1 minimum).  Thus, an investor can exercise his American calls at any time and 
receive the intrinsic value at the current stock price for a total cost of 50 cents per contract (the 
$1 minimum corresponds to 200 shares, i.e., two option contracts).  Exercise of a put that 
requires first buying the stock to be delivered is similar, and it is even cheaper if the put is 
protecting stock that is already owned, since no stock trade is needed.  Commissions at Charles 
Schwab, another large low-cost retail broker are somewhat higher, but still low enough that they 
are easily outweighed by even a very small EBV. 
The alternative strategy of holding call options unexercised, but getting rid of their market 
exposure by delta-hedging with the stock through expiration day is more costly than early 
exercise. The commission to trade the stock in setting up the hedge will be about the same as to 
sell out the stock acquired by exercising a call, but depending on the path of stock prices, 
maintaining delta neutrality can entail actively rebalancing the hedge over time and many more 
stock trades.  In addition, maintaining a short position in the stock requires paying the stock 
borrow fee and posting collateral, initially equal to 50% of the stock value, in a margin account 
for the remaining life of the option.  This strategy may be appropriate for the holder of a 
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European call who otherwise would need to sell at the EBV bid, but it will normally be 
dominated by exercise for an American option.5 
5.2  Boundary Violations and Option Trades 
An investor who sells an option at a price below the exercise boundary is (perhaps unknowingly) 
leaving money on the table.  A natural question to ask is how often does that occur?  Although 
the displayed quotes exhibit sustained boundary violations, investors might either exercise their 
options instead of selling or trade strategically by picking the right times to avoid, or at least 
minimize, the boundary violations.  To see whether option traders avoid the inferior prices 
associated with the worst boundary violations, we examine all option trades in our sample that 
occur above, and below, the boundary violation price, using the bid and ask quotes in effect at 
the exact time of the trade.6  For trades below the EBV price, we compute the dollar amount of 
the deviation from the EBV price. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for option trades in our sample.  Option exercises, by 
definition, are excluded.  Note that the relative weighting in this table is by the number of 
transactions, unlike Tables 1 and 2 in which each option has equal weight.  If one option series 
 
5 Delta hedging, in theory, allows recovery of an option's full value, not just intrinsic value, which makes it better 
than exercise in a frictionless world.  The intrinsic value is embedded in the difference between the current stock 
price and the strike, but replication of the optionality value comes from (frictionless) continuous rebalancing of the 
hedge. Frequent rebalancing in the real world quickly leads to large transactions costs, and it does not fully eliminate 
risk.  In most cases, exercise of an American option will be cheaper, easier, and less risky than attempting to exit the 
position synthetically by hedging away its market exposure. 
6 It might seem reasonable to measure execution quality by the difference between the trade price and the quote 
midpoint and then examine whether execution quality improves when the boundary violations are large, because it 
becomes more possible for investors to trade inside the spread.  Unfortunately, this idea does not work because 
investors trying escape EBVs can be expected to try placing limit orders inside the marketmakers' spread, which 
alters the recorded best prices.  We argue below that in an EBV it may be more appropriate to treat the option's 
intrinsic value as the market's best bid. 
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has 10 trades in a day and the second has only one, the first option will generate 10 transaction 
observations, while the second option generates just one.       
Panel (a) shows EBV trading of calls, and Panel (b) of puts, using the same maturity and 
moneyness breakdown as before.  Panel (c) aggregates across categories to report the total 
deviation from selling at EBV prices, which totals about $39 million for the month and 
represents an upper bound on the opportunity costs associated with the failure to exercise.   Most 
of this was due to call option trades, about $37.2 million versus $1.8 million from puts.  
In Panel (a) dollar EBV deviations from trading calls occur in each sub-group, and range from 
three to nine cents per share.  The largest dollar apparent losses, however, are concentrated in the 
near term options, as one expects, because EBVs are larger and more prevalent.  Among the 
near-term, Mid ITM calls, 12.13% of trades and 28.06% of volume occurred below the boundary 
price.  This corresponds to a potential opportunity loss averaging $515.25 per trade.   
Selling at an EBV price can occur from an investor either closing out an existing long position, 
or from establishing a new short position.  Our data cannot distinguish between these two 
motives, but in either case, it is difficult to justify selling an option at a price that gives the 
counterparty the ability to exercise it immediately for a profit.7  Our estimates of the dollar loss 
from EBV trades should be viewed as an upper bound.   
Yet even among options that exhibit EBVs more than 90% of the time, only 12% or so of the 
trades are done at EBV prices.  Interestingly, a higher proportion of trading volume than of 
trades is done at EBVs, which means those trades are larger than average.  It might seem that a 
 
7 One possible reason for establishing a short position at an EBV price is to circumvent short sell rules.  The SEC is 
critical of these strategies.  See SEC Administrative Proceeding 3-14847.   
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possible reason for this is that call exercise followed by selling the shares in the market depends 
on adequate liquidity in the underlying stock.  The average EBV trade size for near term Mid 
ITM options is 130 contracts, which corresponds to 13,000 shares, while the average EBV is 
only $0.04.  Depending on the stock, it could well be that dumping 13,000 shares on the market 
at once could knock the price down at least 4 cents.   
This reasoning could justify selling an option to the market maker at an EBV price, but it is not 
really a good explanation for exercising only at maturity, since the stock will have to be sold in 
the market whenever an in the money call is exercised.  If limited liquidity in the stock makes it 
rational to sell at an EBV before expiration, the option holder should also find it better to sell to 
the market maker than to exercise on expiration day.  The market impact to liquidate the stock is 
not avoided by waiting until option maturity. 
The long maturity Mid ITM calls, which averaged nearly 1500 contracts per trade but very few 
exercises, as we will see in the next section, would certainly be consistent with this explanation.  
In contrast, put options exhibit a much smaller fraction of EBV trades and volume.  Although the 
boundary violations for several of the put sub-samples are around $0.40 per share, only a very 
few such trades were done, which makes the overall loss much smaller.   
The summary of these results in Panel (c) shows that investors generally avoided selling at sub-
optimal prices.  Of all in-the-money option trades, only 11.52% of trading volume and 2.01% of 
trades occurred below the boundary price. On average, the transaction price was about $0.04 
below the exercise boundary price, corresponding to a loss of about $521.81 per trade.  The 
evidence suggests that investors adjust their trading behavior to the boundary violations, 
although it is difficult to prove unambiguously.  Comparing the average EBV for trades against 
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the average EBV quotes for the same option categories in Table 1 reveals that investors who did 
trade managed to avoid the worst of the boundary violations, consistent with getting some price 
improvement on their trades.  Given how pervasive boundary violations were in the quotes, 
surely more than 2% of trades and 11.5% of volume would be below the boundary price if 
traders were not paying attention to EBVs.  At a minimum, these results are consistent with 
investors responding rationally to EBVs. 
Muravyev and Pearson (2014) suggest an alternative explanation for the lower EBVs associated 
with option trades.  They show that the underlying stock price can exhibit considerable variation 
without triggering a change in the option quotes and investors incorporate this information to 
strategically time their trades to lower their effective trading costs.  This is consistent with 
observing a smaller EBV from actual trades than from option quotes.   
Nevertheless, the aggregate deviation from EBV prices of $39 million for just one month is a 
material amount and at least some of it could have been saved by exercising the options instead 
of selling them.  By comparison, the opportunity loss from these trades exceeds the losses 
documented in Pool, Stoll, and Whaley (2008) from the failure to exercise call options before ex-
dividend days (about $4 million per month), and the losses reported in Barraclough and Whaley 
(2012) from the failure to exercise put options (about $13 million per month).   
6.  Boundary Violations and Option Exercises  
Section 4 established that exercise boundary violations are frequent, persistent, and economically 
significant.  In this section we examine how boundary violations affect exercise decisions.   
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Previous studies reported evidence of early exercise among exchange-traded American-style 
options but without focusing on EBVs.8  Given that there appears to be little awareness of the 
significance of boundary violations in the literature and the established theory emphasizes that 
early exercise is sub-optimal, it is an open question whether these exercises are mostly mistakes 
or rational responses to pervasive EBVs.   
To examine this question, we analyze the option exercises during our sample period.  The 
available data report only the total number of contracts exercised on a given day, so 20 contracts 
could be one exercise for all 20, or 20 exercises for 1 contract each.  We therefore define the 
occurrence of one or more exercises for a given contract on a particular day as an Exercise 
Event. 
Customers and market makers have different reasons for holding or exercising in-the-money 
option positions.  A customer with Deep ITM calls most likely bought them for lower prices at 
some earlier time and may now want to exit the position and take her profit.  A market maker 
rarely has a long term investment motive and will typically acquire an ITM option position by 
taking the opposite side of a customer's trade.  If he buys calls or puts at an EBV price, he may 
well simply exercise immediately and take the arbitrage profit, rather than holding illiquid high 
priced options in inventory.  Alternatively, he may retain the options if there is a reasonable 
chance to sell them at his ask price before too long, especially if the delta and other Greek letter 
exposures are useful in hedging the rest of his trading book.  A customer with deep in-the-money 
puts may well be holding them to protect the value of a long position in the underlying stock.  
 
8 Examples include Diz and Finucane (1993), Overdahl and Martin (1994), Finucane (1997), Engstrom (2002), Pool, 
Stoll, and Whaley (2008), Hao, Kalay, and Mayhew (2010), Barraclough and Whaley (2012), and Jensen and 
Pedersen (2016).   
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Since liquidating the puts would ruin the hedge, she may be more willing to hold onto them 
through expiration, even when theory might suggest early exercise would be optimal. 
Summary statistics for exercise events are presented in Table 4.  None of these exercises should 
be dividend related, since we exclude all observations from the day before an ex-dividend day.    
We also exclude the final day before expiration in order to look only at early exercise. 
Panel (a) shows that early exercise of calls unconnected to dividend payout is frequent.  The 
Total column at the far right shows that in March 2010 there were 10,334 exercise events 
involving 950,683 contracts.   As expected, exercise is related to option maturity and moneyness.  
Near term calls in the Deep and Mid ITM categories experience the most exercises, by both 
customers and market makers.   Customers have more exercise event days but exercise fewer 
contracts than market makers overall.9   
Panels (b)-(d) of Table 4 provide the exercise statistics for put options.  Unlike calls, if an 
American put in a frictionless market goes deep enough in-the-money, it becomes rational in 
theory to exercise it early.  For any given put, on every day t there is an early exercise stock price 
St* such that if the stock price is below St*, the put is worth less than its intrinsic value and it 
should be exercised.  For each put observation in our data, we compute the critical stock price for 
(theoretically) rational early exercise in a Binomial model.  The put is then classified as one that 
should, or should not, be exercised early.  Note that exercise when the stock is below St* does not 
necessarily mean the investor followed the theoretically optimal strategy.  That would require 
exercising the put the first time the boundary is breached.  Also, it is important to recognize that 
 
9 Barraclough and Whaley (2012) also found that market makers exhibit early exercise behavior that runs 
counter to conventional theory. 
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there is no direct connection between the critical stock price and an EBV.  A put may be in the 
range where its fair value is above intrinsic value and theoretically it should not be exercised, yet 
if the best available bid in the market is an EBV, the option holder who must liquidate still does 
better by exercising the put than by selling it. 
Panel (b) shows that there were fewer early exercises of put options than call options, 4324 
versus 10,344 exercise events, although they exhibit similar patterns across maturity and 
moneyness as in Panel (a).  One reason for the difference in exercises, as shown in Table 1, is 
that for the near-term Deep and Mid ITM contracts, there were simply many more quotes for 
calls than for puts.10  The ratio of market maker exercises to total exercises is also higher for puts 
(78.8%) than for calls (58.8%).  This would be consistent with the idea that customers may be 
relatively more reluctant to exercise puts that are hedging a stock position.  There is little 
exercise of either long maturity calls or puts. 
Comparing Panels (c) and (d), put option exercises are divided evenly between those that should 
have been exercised early in theory and those that should not.  Of the 267,604 total put exercises, 
just 51.7% occurred when the stock price was below the early exercise price barrier.  Panel (c) 
shows that, relative to customers, market makers were more likely to exercise when it was 
theoretically correct to do so. 
 
 
10  Exchanges introduce option strikes around the current underlying stock price, and as the stock price moves, new 
strikes are introduced while existing options may go deep in or out of the money.  A moderate advance in the stock 
market in the months before March 2010 left many of the previously introduced calls deep in-the-money and the 
corresponding puts out of-the-money (and out of our sample).   
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6.1 Estimating the Likelihood of Early Exercise 
The previous section demonstrated that despite being irrational in theory, early exercise is 
common in the real world.  This section investigates early exercise in a more structured 
framework by fitting logit models for the probability of option exercise.  The sample consists of 
all individual options that have either positive trading volume or a change in open interest on a 
given day.  We exclude any options with a zero bid price and require each option series to have 
at least 385 valid quote minutes per day. 
In our logit specifications, the likelihood of early exercise is related to the moneyness and 
maturity.  Our operational measure of moneyness is related to the probability that the option will 
still be in-the-money at maturity and this is proportional to √T.  We measure this by (X/S)/√T for 
call options and by (S/X)/√T for put options. Scaling the moneyness by √T makes the measure 
more comparable across maturities.  Since there is a wide variation in the daily minimum EBV, 
we use an indicator variable that is one if the daily minimum is at least five cents, and zero 
otherwise. For the persistence of boundary violations, we compute the number of minutes during 
the trading day that an option exhibited a boundary violation.  We also include the option’s 
volume, open interest, and implied volatility as control variables.  For the put models, we include 
an additional indicator variable that is one if the stock price is below the critical level where the 
put should be exercised early, and zero otherwise. 
The results are presented in Table 5.  The first three columns contain the estimates for call 
options, while the last three columns provide the put option estimates.  As expected, the results 
in column 1 show that the likelihood of early exercise for call options is strongly related to our 
moneyness measure.  The interesting result, however, is that both EBV variables are highly 
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significant.  All else constant, the existence of EBVs and their duration, strongly predict early 
exercise.  Of the control variables, open interest and daily trading volume are positively related 
to the exercise likelihood, while the implied volatility is insignificant.   
The results are similar for the put options, as shown in column 4.  Both EBV variables are again 
highly significant as is the early exercise price boundary variable, suggesting that exercise is 
more likely when the price is below the early exercise price barrier.  Open interest is positively 
related to the exercise likelihood while the implied volatility and trading volume are 
insignificant.   
One notable difference between the call and put results is that the moneyness coefficient for the 
puts is insignificant.  One possible reason for this is that these puts have two desirable hedging 
properties: they have negative exposure to the underlying stock and virtually no gamma.  If the 
puts are being used to hedge a long exposure to the underlying stock, then their exercise would 
require delivering the stock and liquidating the hedge, which may well not fit with the investor's 
long-term investment plan. 
Table 5 shows some interesting differences between customer and market maker exercises.  
Comparing columns 2 and 3, the coefficients for the EBV variables are significantly larger for 
the market makers, suggesting that they respond more aggressively to EBVs than do the 
customers.  Similarly, the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 show that market makers are more 
responsive than customers to both the EBVs and the early put exercise price barrier.     
A potential concern is that our results may influenced by liquidity differences related to price 
levels.  As discussed earlier, the minimum bid-ask spread is $0.10 for option prices above $3.00 
and $0.05 for prices below $3.00.  As a robustness check, we tried adding two indicator variables 
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to the logit model from Table 5.  The first variable was one if the option price was between $2.50 
and $3.00, and zero otherwise, while the second was one if the price was between $3.00 and 
$3.50 and zero otherwise.  Five of the six sub-samples failed to reject the hypothesis of equality.  
We also reestimated the Table 5 specifications for the pilot and non-pilot samples separately.  
The relation between EBVs and likelihood of early exercise for both sub-samples was similar to 
the results from Table 5.  Finally, as a robustness check, we included the bid-ask spread of the 
option as a proxy for short sale costs.  The results from Table 5 were unchanged, and the 
coefficients on the bid-ask variables were generally negative. 
Overall, our results suggest that early exercise is a rational response to EBVs and we need to 
revisit the claim that American-style options on non-dividend paying stocks should not be 
exercised before maturity.  Further, our findings illustrate the importance of incorporating EVBs 
into option pricing models.  If option investors are aware of EBVs and try to avoid or minimize 
them, this will be reflected in option liquidity and the early exercise premium.  We discuss these 
issues in the next section.   
7.   EBVs and the Measurement of the Early Exercise Premium, Implied Volatilities, and 
Market Liquidity 
7.1 Boundary Violations and the Early Exercise Premium 
Boundary violations in real world markets make exercise the rational way to unwind an in-the-
money American option position for a much broader range of maturity and moneyness 
conditions than would be expected in a frictionless market.  The economically meaningful 
increase in liquidity that American exercise provides relative to a comparable European option 
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should be reflected in an early exercise premium that is on top of any premium related to future 
dividend payout, and empirical research supports this view. 
Figlewski (2017) develops an alternative American option pricing model that takes EBVs into 
account.  Two assumptions are added to a standard Black-Scholes setting.  First, the market bid 
price for a call is always the Black-Scholes value less half the bid-ask spread, which is modeled 
as a fixed minimum plus a constant times the amount the option is in the money.  This induces 
EBVs for ITM calls.   
Secondly, the position may need to be liquidated before expiration.  There is a certain probability 
that the option will be held to maturity, and a constant conditional probability of liquidation on 
any prior date t, given that the investor has not liquidated before t.  In this framework it is 
possible to compute the dollar value of American exercise in closed-form using a replication 
strategy.   
As an illustration, we considered the additional value of American exercise for a call using the 
following parameter values, that are roughly comparable to those found in our data sample:  
Stock price = 100; Exercise price = 80; Maturity = 30 days; Volatility = 40%; Interest: 5%; 
Probability of liquidation before expiration: 75%, with constant intensity per day; no dividends.  
Extensive empirical work was not done, but rough estimates of the bid-ask spread parameters 
were computed for a small number of stocks, ranging from very active ones like Exxon-Mobil 
and Facebook, to less active ones like T-Mobile and TripAdvisor.  Although they differed greatly 
in their spread behavior, all were among the top 20% in trading volume in the population of 
traded options.  Under these assumptions, the liquidity value of American exercise for an 80-
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strike call was $0.05, $0.39, or $0.89 for a high, medium, or lower (but still top 20%) option 
volume stock.   
For comparison, the average dividend yield on a stock in the S&P 500 is about 2% annually, or 
$0.50 a quarter on a $100 stock.  Consider a 30-day American call with the same terms as above 
on a stock that will go ex-dividend by $0.50 in 15 days.  An American call in this case would be 
worth about $0.23 more than the equivalent European call.  Thus the possibility of liquidity-
based early exercise adds substantial value to an American call.  Moreover, this is in addition to 
the value of exercise to get a dividend. 
7.2 Boundary Violations and Mark-to-Market Option Valuation 
It is customary to consider an option's market price to be the midpoint between the current best 
bid and ask prices.  But one might argue that when the market bid price for an American option 
is an EBV, the lowest portion of the bid-ask spread becomes somewhat irrelevant to the value of 
the option, since the investor can realize a larger value by exercise.  The most obvious case is 
when the bid is so low that the midpoint is also below intrinsic value.  For the purpose of setting 
the required margin on an option position, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to value the 
option at the bid-ask midpoint when a higher value could be obtained by immediate exercise.  In 
such a case, it could make sense to replace the EBV bid quote with the option's intrinsic value. 
7.3 Boundary Violations and Implied Volatilities and Other Implicit Parameters 
Boundary violations have implications for the calculation of implied volatilities and option hedge 
parameters, as well as for the implicit parameters which arise in more elaborate models that 
extend Black-Scholes.   
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An option's implied volatility is generally computed from the bid-ask midpoint, which assumes 
the midpoint is an unbiased estimate of the true option price.  But since a call must be priced 
above intrinsic value in a theoretical model, implied volatility is undefined in the Black-Scholes 
model at an EBV bid price, as are the implied parameters in more sophisticated pricing models.  
When the quote midpoint is also below intrinsic value, IV and other implied parameters are 
unavailable.  In this case, also, it might be better to replace the EBV bid price with the option's 
intrinsic value. 
7.4 Boundary violations and liquidity measures. 
Boundary violations have important implications for measures of transaction costs.   One 
interpretation of a boundary violation is that the traditional bid-ask spread is too large.  A more 
realistic ‘adjusted’ estimate of the bid-ask spread facing investors would be the difference 
between the ask price and the maximum of either the bid price, or the intrinsic value.     
The difference between the traditional and boundary adjusted spreads can be substantial.  For the 
deep in-the-money near-term call options in Table 1, the average traditional spread is about 
$0.72 while the boundary adjusted spread is only $0.38.  The difference is smaller, but still 
substantial, for near-term Near ATM calls:  $0.33 for the traditional spread and $0.26 for the 
boundary adjusted spread.   
Many studies have used option bid and ask prices to make inferences about regulatory issues, 
market making costs, and option price dynamics.  While it is uncertain how much these analyses 
are affected by boundary violations, given their prevalence, the violations are surely a material 
component of the data.  An important implication is that it would be comparatively easy for a 
retail broker to offer option investors significant price improvement simply by providing a real 
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time comparison of the payoffs to exercising vs. selling their options.  Alternatively, it should be 
straightforward for an algorithm to automatically route the customer’s order to the best 
alternative, which would include early exercise.  In our conversations with option broker-dealers 
some confirmed that they inform their customers when their trades would be sub-optimal.   
8.  Conclusion 
Numerous studies have noted that options are often exercised early and concluded that investors 
behave irrationally.  In this study, we pay careful attention to intraday option quotes and reach 
the opposite conclusion: early exercise is often the rational choice for options investors.  The 
reason for this counter-intuitive result is simply that an option’s bid price is frequently less than 
the option’s intrinsic value.   In these situations, selling at the bid price would yield fewer dollars 
than exercising the option and thus exercise becomes the rational choice.  
We define an exercise boundary violation (EBV) as a situation where an option’s bid price is low 
enough that an investor would be better off exercising his option instead of selling it.  Previous 
research has noted the existence of boundary violations; our paper provides the first systematic 
analysis of EBVs.  Using a sample of all U.S. stock options from March 2010, we show that 
boundary violations are common, persistent, and economically significant.  Across all in-the-
money calls, 48.6% of option quotes exhibit EBVs, with an average violation of $0.31.   
We find that option investors respond rationally to EBV quotes.  In the cross-section of 
individual options, we find that the existence and duration of exercise boundary violations 
strongly predict the likelihood of early exercise.  This holds for both calls and puts.  Similarly, 
option investors are generally able to avoid selling their options at sub-optimal prices. In cases 
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where the bid price is below the option’s intrinsic value, we find only a small fraction of trades 
occur at prices below intrinsic value.   
The prevalence of boundary violations has important implications for option pricing.  In theory, 
the only incremental value to an American call option above a European option is the ability to 
exercise just before an ex-dividend date.  However, the American option’s ability to avoid the 
EBVs gives it a source of value that is independent of dividends and it may help explain the 
puzzle that American options appear to be too expensive when compared to European options.   
More generally, boundary violations are inconsistent with the assumptions made in traditional 
option pricing models, in which option quotes and trades should never be below intrinsic value.  
Yet, these events are commonplace.  Liquidity issues have been shown to be important in other 
areas of finance.  In the options market, these issues cannot be reduced to "noise" around 
theoretical relationships which may be ignored in empirical work.  Liquidity constraints can lead 
to quite different behavior in practice than what may be optimal in theory.  New models that can 
predict market behavior consistent with the data are needed.    
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Option Quotes 
 
This table contains summary statistics for all option quotes during March 2010.  Quotes from options with less than 180 observations per day or 
quotes with a zero bid price are excluded.  Total EBV quotes is the number of quotes that exhibit exercise boundary violations.  % Quotes with EBV 
is the percentage of quotes that exhibit boundary violations.  % Options with EBV is the fraction of options that have one or more boundary 
violations during a trading day.  Unconditional EBV is the mean boundary violation, averaged across all quotes.  Conditional EBV is the mean 
boundary violation averaged across all quotes with boundary violations.  EBV Adjusted Spread is the bid-ask spread computed from the ask price 
and the maximum of either the bid price or exercise boundary price.  In the column headings for calls, Deep ITM corresponds to call options with a 
strike price/stock price ratio of between .5 and .7.  Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio between .7 and .9, and Near refers to a ratio 
between .9 and 1.0.  In the column headings for puts Deep ITM corresponds to put options with a strike price/stock price ratio of between 1.3 and 
1.5.  Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio between 1.1 and 1.3, and Near refers to a ratio between 1.0 and 1.1.  
 
Panel (a): Call Options 
 
Maturity < 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months 
Moneyness Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
 
         
Total Quotes 24,233,775 39,210,622 20,603,553 41,276,612 62,774,801 34,708,238 56,578,410 69,881,531 36,786,243 
Total EBV Quotes 23,925,783 36,374,930 7,538,395 38,676,453 34,011,298 1,804,803 33,821,214 11,251,916 332,710 
% Quotes with EBV 98.73% 92.77% 36.59% 93.70% 54.18% 5.20% 59.78% 16.10% 0.90% 
% Options with EBV 99.00% 98.21% 57.40% 98.13% 73.15% 12.67% 74.98% 26.80% 2.28% 
 
    
 
    
Option Bid Price $15.90 $7.67 $2.27 $16.20 $7.85 $3.14 $19.71 $10.53 $5.77 
Option $ Spread $0.72 $0.58 $0.33 $0.85 $0.61 $0.34 $1.02 $0.73 $0.46 
Option % Spread 9.26% 15.05% 31.71% 10.21% 13.90% 20.23% 9.29% 12.82% 15.57% 
 
    
 
    
Unconditional EBV $0.34 $0.25 $0.07 $0.37 $0.16 $0.01 $0.27 $0.06 $0.00 
Conditional EBV $0.35 $0.26 $0.14 $0.38 $0.24 $0.18 $0.39 $0.28 $0.35 
 
    
 
    
EBV Adjusted $ Spread $0.38 $0.33 $0.26 $0.48 $0.45 $0.33 $0.75 $0.67 $0.46 
EBV Adjusted % Spread 4.85% 8.60% 26.11% 5.75% 10.26% 18.90% 6.61% 11.20% 15.02% 
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Panel (b): Put Options 
 
Maturity < 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2- 4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months 
Moneyness Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
 
         
Total Quotes 12,146,014 27,155,723 19,520,667 22,905,184 46,400,832 33,022,460 33,962,640 54,848,071 35,199,807 
Total EBV Quotes 11,788,040 24,348,361 7,062,711 17,565,888 19,510,454 1,386,092 8,931,651 3,301,589 208,339 
% Quotes with EBV 97.05% 89.66% 36.18% 76.69% 42.05% 4.20% 26.30% 6.02% 0.59% 
% Options with EBV 99.27% 97.14% 55.96% 90.09% 62.73% 10.35% 43.51% 13.00% 1.40% 
 
         
Option Bid Price $12.81 $6.90 $2.10 $14.15 $7.45 $3.05 $19.51 $10.75 $5.89 
Option $ Spread $0.65 $0.58 $0.34 $0.76 $0.59 $0.34 $0.84 $0.63 $0.43 
Option % Spread 12.23% 17.48% 35.09% 11.48% 14.89% 20.27% 8.94% 11.37% 14.04% 
 
         
Unconditional EBV $0.30 $0.24 $0.07 $0.26 $0.12 $0.01 $0.11 $0.03 $0.00 
Conditional EBV $0.31 $0.25 $0.14 $0.30 $0.22 $0.20 $0.30 $0.33 $0.39 
 
         
EBV Adjusted $ Spread $0.35 $0.34 $0.27 $0.50 $0.47 $0.33 $0.73 $0.60 $0.42 
EBV Adjusted % Spread 6.52% 10.46% 29.20% 7.35% 11.67% 19.09% 7.18% 10.27% 13.56% 
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Table 2 
Duration of Boundary Violations 
This table examines the persistence of exercise boundary violations for all options.  Option Days represents the number of individual options with 
positive option trading volume on day t and complete intraday quote data for day t.  10:00 a.m. EBV Frequency is the fraction of quotes that show 
exercise boundary violations when measured at 10:00 a.m.  Avg Size of 10:00 a.m. EBV is the mean exercise boundary violation at 10:00 a.m., 
conditional on observing a boundary violation at 10:00 a.m.  Avg Duration of EBV is the average number of minutes after 10:00 a.m. the boundary 
violation persists.  In the column headings for calls, Deep ITM corresponds to call options with a strike price/stock price ratio of between .5 and .7.  
Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio between .7 and .9, and Near refers to a ratio between .9 and 1.0.  In the column headings for puts 
Deep ITM corresponds to put options with a strike price/stock price ratio of between 1.3 and 1.5.  Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio 
between 1.1 and 1.3, and Near refers to a ratio between 1.0 and 1.1. 
Panel (a): Calls 
Maturity < 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months 
Moneyness Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
          
Option Days 64,497 104,737 55,087 110,416 167,730 92,759 151,442 186,581 98,357 
10:00 a.m. EBV Frequency 99.56% 93.43% 35.77% 93.96% 53.51% 4.92% 59.51% 15.84% 0.93% 
Avg Size of 10:00 a.m. EBV $0.38 $0.29 $0.19 $0.40 $0.30 $0.28 $0.46 $0.39 $0.41 
Avg Duration of EBV 348 297 189 313 235 157 266 228 178 
 
Panel (b): Puts 
 
Maturity < 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months 
Moneyness Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
          
Option Days 32,804 72,812 52,309 61,878 124,258 88,316 91,364 146,771 94,144 
10:00 a.m. EBV Frequency 97.31% 90.46% 36.46% 77.41% 42.65% 4.35% 26.64% 6.27% 0.55% 
Avg Size of 10:00 a.m. EBV $0.33 $0.29 $0.20 $0.34 $0.29 $0.30 $0.41 $0.45 $0.46 
Avg Duration of EBV 335 296 196 274 216 154 207 188 219 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Option Trades 
 
This table provides summary statistics for all in-the-money option trades during March 2010.  Total Trades is the aggregate number of trades that 
occurred for each sub-group.  % Trades<EBV is the percentage of trades that occur at a price below the exercise boundary price.  % Volume<EBV is 
the percentage of volume that occurs at a price below the exercise boundary price.  Trade Size is the average number of contracts for trades that occur 
at a price below the exercise boundary price.  $ Deviation per share is the average dollar amount per share from selling at a price below the exercise 
boundary price.  $ Deviation per trade is the average dollar amount per trade from selling at a price below the exercise boundary price.   $ Deviation 
Total is the cumulative amount for each sub group from selling at a price below the exercise boundary price.  In the column headings for calls, Deep 
ITM corresponds to call options with a strike price/stock price ratio of between .5 and .7.  Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio between 
.7 and .9, and Near refers to a ratio between .9 and 1.0.  In the column headings for puts, Deep ITM corresponds to put options with a strike 
price/stock price ratio of between 1.3 and 1.5.  Mid refers to a stock price price/strike price ratio between 1.1 and 1.3, and Near refers to a ratio 
between 1.0 and 1.1. 
  Panel (a): Call Options   
         
Maturity  < 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months >4 Months 
Moneyness  Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near          
 
 
Total trades 19,030 179,246 1,148,077 17,433 161,612 702,221 38,459 119,368 212,439 
% Trades<EBV 12.10% 12.13% 2.21% 12.40% 3.79% 0.14% 5.37% 0.82% 0.00% 
% Volume<EBV 22.26% 28.06% 14.27% 40.73% 17.95% 0.57% 18.24% 37.30% 0.16% 
Trade size 31.21 130.29 194.70 122.51 138.20 72.58 206.87 1457.57 108.78 
$ Deviation per share  $0.09  $0.04  $0.03  $0.05  $0.04  $0.06  $0.04 $0.03  $0.04 
$ Deviation per trade  $282.31  $515.25  $560.70  $638.69  $536.64  $454.09  $835.67 $4372.59  $482.89 
$ Deviation total  $649,884 $11,204,146 $14,211,482  $1,380,211  $3,284,747  $446,829  $1,725,656 $4,258,904  $30,422  
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Panel (b): 
Put Options 
          
 
 
  
         
Maturity 
 
< 1 Month < 1 Month < 1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months > 4 Months > 4 Months >4 Months 
Moneyness 
 
Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near        
   
 
Total trades 5,732 46,101 542,766 5,770 48,804 307,684 12,297 47,104 108,016 
% EBV Trades 15.49% 8.69% 1.18% 6.41% 2.11% 0.05% 0.02% 0.11% 0.01% 
% EBV Volume 21.87% 6.52% 1.05% 3.03% 2.63% 0.08% 0.24% 0.12% 0.00% 
Trade size 26.14 13.51 16.24 11.90 30.38 33.55 11.58 25.40 6.78 
$ Deviation per share  $0.05  $0.07  $0.06  $0.13  $0.11 $0.44  $0.38  $0.40  $1.01 
$ Deviation per trade  $126.03  $89.09  $96.19  $156.69  $334.63 $1467.70  $444.54  $1027.19  $683.56 
$ Deviation total  $111,917  $356,733  $617,069 $57,976  $344,330 $239,235  $25,339  $53,414  $6,152          
 
 
 
Panel (c): All Options  
  
Calls & 
Puts Calls Puts       
            
Total trades 3,722,159 2,597,885 1,124,274       
% Trades<EBV 2.01% 2.38% 1.16%       
% Volume<EBV 11.52% 14.81% 0.98%       
Trade size 148.50 176.09 17.30       
$ Deviation  per share $0.04 $0.03 $0.08       
$ Deviation per trade $521.81 $602.20 $139.54       
$ Deviation total $39,004,446 $37,192,281 $1,812,165       
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 Table 4 
 
 Summary Statistics for Option Exercises 
This table provides summary statistics for option contracts exercised before maturity during March 2010.  An exercise event is when one or more 
contracts on an individual option are exercised on day t.  Total Contracts Traded is the total trading volume on days when exercise events occurred.  
In Panel (c), Total contracts/total volume for puts that should be exercised is the ratio of exercise volume to trading volume on exercise event days.   
Near Term options have one month or less to maturity, Medium Term have two to four months, and Long term have at least five months to 
expiration.  The Deep in-the-money calls have a strike price/stock price between .5 and .7, Mid options have a ratio between .7 and .9, and Near has a 
ratio between .9 and 1.0.  For put options, Deep corresponds to ratio of between 1.3 and 1.5, Mid has a ratio between 1.1 and 1.3, and Near refers to a 
ratio between 1.0 and 1.1. 
Panel (a): Call Options           
           
Maturity Category <1 Month < 1 Month <1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months >4 Months >4 Months >4 Months  Total 
Strike Price Category Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near   
Exercise Events Total 2,289 4,893 1,313 833 581 62 258 104 11 10,344 
Exercise Events Customer 1,108 3,402 1,106 479 428 47 154 84 8 6,816 
Exercise Events Market Maker 1,384 1,912 285 401 175 17 110 22 3 4,309 
Contracts Exercised Total 155,361 524,900 159,001 45,004 35,476 23,856 4,449 2,589 47 950,683 
Contracts Exercised Customer 42,495 193,552 93,226 16,035 21,325 21,683 1,948 1,140 12 391,416 
Contracts Exercised Market Maker 112,866 331,348 65,775 28,969 14,151 2,173 2,501 1,449 35 559,267 
           
Panel (b): All Put Options    
         
           
Maturity Category <1 Month < 1 Month <1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months >4 Months >4 Months >4 Months Total 
Strike Price Category Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
 
Exercise Events Total 619 2,291 861 257 262 17 9 6 2 4,324 
Exercise Events Customer 170 720 378 48 59 11 4 6 0 1,396 
Exercise Events Market Maker 467 1,693 566 212 207 7 5 0 2 3,159 
Contract Exercised Total 49,079 128,659 64,186 11,590 13,178 649 167 75 21 267,604 
Contracts Exercised Customer 10,733 35,829 16,607 2,047 1,927 76 15 75 0 67,309 
Contracts Exercised Market Maker 38,346 92,830 47,579 9,543 11,251 573 152 0 21 200,295 
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Panel (c): Put Options that 
should be exercised early 
          
           
Maturity Category <1 Month < 1 Month <1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months >4 Months >4 Months >4 Months Total 
Strike Price Category Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
 
Exercise Events Total 405 1,217 351 82 49 0 1 0 0 2,105 
Exercise Events Customer 100 319 118 11 5 0 0 0 0 553 
Exercise Events Market Maker 317 974 279 72 45 0 1 0 0 1,688 
Contract Exercised Total 39,267 64,956 30,374 2,075 1,593 0 1 0 0 138,266 
Contracts Exercised Customer 6,670 15,012 6,116 102 243 0 0 0 0 28,143 
Total Contracts Traded 26,025 105,271 69,030 2,387 2,578 935 14 51 0 206,291 
Total Contracts/Total Volume 150.88% 61.70% 44.00% 86.93% 61.79% 0.00% 7.14% 0.00% 
 
67.02% 
           
Panel (d): Put Options that 
should not be exercised 
early 
          
           
Maturity Category <1 Month < 1 Month <1 Month 2-4 Months 2-4 Months 2-4 Months >4 Months >4 Months >4 Months Total 
Strike Price Category Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near Deep Mid Near 
 
Exercise Events Total 214 1,074 510 175 213 17 8 6 2 2,219 
Exercise Events Customer 70 401 260 37 54 11 4 6 0 843 
Exercise Events Market Maker 150 719 287 140 162 7 4 0 2 1,471 
Contract Exercised Total 9,812 63,703 33,812 9,515 11,585 649 166 75 21 129,338 
Contracts Exercised Customer 4,063 20,817 10,491 1,945 1,684 76 15 75 0 39,166 
Contracts Exercised Market Maker 5,749 42,886 23,321 7,570 9,901 573 151 0 21 90,172 
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Table 5 
The Likelihood of Early Option Exercise 
 
This table provides estimates of logit models for the probability that an option is exercised before maturity.  The dependent variable is one if an 
option is exercised on day t and zero otherwise.  Moneyness for call options is (X/S)/√T.  EBV>0_minutes is the number of minutes during the 
trading day that an individual option exhibits a boundary violation.  EBV>.05 is an indicator variable if the minimum boundary violation for an 
individual option during day t is at least .05, and zero otherwise.  Daily trading volume is the number of contracts on an individual option that are 
traded on day t, in 1000s.  Open interest is the open interest for an individual option at the close of day t in 1000s.  Implied Volatility is as of the 
close of day t.  The moneyness variable for put options is defined as (S/X)/√T.   Early exercise boundary is an indicator variable that is one if the 
price of the stock is sufficiently low that early exercise is optimal.  The t-statistics for all models are adjusted for conditional heteroskedasticity and 
reported in parentheses.    
 Total   Customer  
Market 
Maker  Total   Customer  
Market 
Maker 
 Call Exercises  Call Exercises  Call Exercises  Put Exercises  Put Exercises  Put Exercises 
Constant -6.617   -6.662   -8.794   -7.667   -7.919   -8.843 
  (-111.94)   (-113.16)   (-44.25)   (-48.395)   (-55.94)   (-34.08) 
Moneyness 0.127   0.129   0.067   -0.018   0.099   -0.036 
  (34.03)   (32.84)   (14.25)   (-0.313)   (12.07)   (-5.40) 
Minutes EBV > 0 0.012   0.011   0.016   0.015   0.012   0.018 
  (71.92)   (65.21)   (29.43)   (34.535)   (30.37)   (25.34) 
EBV >= .05 1.066   0.681   0.928   0.883   0.333   0.672 
  (41.11)   (23.47)   (27.51)   (18.130)   (5.13)   (13.53) 
Daily trading volume / 1000 0.059   0.058   0.024   -0.007   0.019   -0.076 
  (2.12)   (2.15)   (2.48)   (-0.466)   (1.31)   (-0.47) 
Open interest / 1000 0.006   0.006   0.002   0.012   0.007   0.013 
  (3.04)   (3.01)   (0.91)   (5.800)   (2.42)   (4.72) 
Implied Volatility 0.000   -0.000   -0.003   -0.035   0.004   -0.096 
  (-0.06)   (-0.06)   (-0.65)   (-1.362)   (0.11)   (-3.21) 
Early exercise boundary             1.195   0.072   1.196 
              (25.810)   (0.98)   (22.17) 
              
Pseudo R2 0.224  0.139  0.095  0.247  0.066  0.197 
Observations 197,610   197,610   197,610   104,329   104,321   104,321 
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